The Faster Return to Work (FRW) scheme that Norwegian authorities implemented in 2007 is an example of a policy that builds on the human capital approach. The main idea behind the scheme is that long waiting times for hospital treatment lead to unnecessarily long periods of absence from work. To achieve a reduction in average sickness absence duration, the allocation of FRW funds and new treatment capacity is exclusively aimed at people on sick leave. Many countries have allocated funds to reduce waiting times for hospital treatment and research shows that more resources allocated to the hospital sector can reduce waiting times. Our results support this as the FRW scheme significantly reduces waiting times.
Introduction
In a health care system financed by general taxes, it is not unusual that the demands for some health services are rationed through waiting lists. In principle, prioritization of planned admissions to hospital is based on first-come-first-serve basis.
In such a health care system, it is customary that additional resources are allocated to services where waiting times are long relative to some explicit goal or to services where the time factor is crucial in terms of avoiding permanent loss of functionality or avoiding premature deaths.
However, according to the human capital approach resources should first and foremost be allocated to health services for which the indirect cost (or opportunity cost) of waiting for treatment is the largest, all else equal. For example, additional resources specifically aimed at employed people in need of planned hospital treatment will lead to a better cost-benefit ratio compared to resources allocated to children, the unemployed and retired people, the argument goes. The reasoning is that waiting lists prolong productivity losses compared to a situation without rationing. Additional resources aimed at employed people will therefore contribute to reduce the productivity loss in connection with sickness absence and to decrease the level of sickness benefit transfers. The human capital approach is controversial but some argue that prioritization should be addressed, at least in part, by using the indirect cost argument (Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health, 2006) .
The Faster Return to Work (FRW) scheme that Norwegian authorities implemented in
2007 is an example of a policy that builds on the human capital approach. The main idea behind the FRW scheme is that long waiting times for hospital treatment lead to unnecessarily long periods of absence from work. Around 40 % of persons registered as being on sick leave receive hospital treatment (Holmås and Kjerstad, 2010) during the sick leave episode. The average waiting time for hospital treatment is around 70 days (Norwegian Directorate of Health, 2008) . This indicates that a reduction in waiting times could lead to a reduction in length of sick leave and faster return to work. Obviously, the goal of FRW is that waiting times and thus total length of sickness absences shall decrease as a result of increased treatment capacity. To achieve this, the extra treatment capacity financed through the FRW scheme is exclusively for people on sick leave.
The National Health and Social Insurance system in Norway, as in many other countries, is under economic stress from an increasing number of disability and sickness benefit claimants (Bonato and Lusinyan, 2004; OECD, 2010) . On a given working day, around 6.5 % of the workforce (130,000 persons) receives sickness benefits based on a sickness certificate from a general practitioner (GP) (The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), 2013). As part of an on-going effort by the Norwegian government to reduce both the incidence and the duration of absences from work, a committee comprised of representatives from central government, labour unions and employer organizations proposed a set of new measures to reduce sickness absences. Among the implemented measures is the FRW scheme.
2 The FRW scheme was introduced early 2007 and the Norwegian Government spent approximately NOK 500 million (around EUR 70 million) yearly in the period 2007-2009 on additional treatment capacity aimed only at people participating in the labour force. 3 The interesting research question is whether the FWR contributes to enhance welfare. We level the playing field and ask: Does prioritization through the FRW scheme lead to a welfare enhancing reduction in productivity losses caused by waiting lists?
We use a dataset on individuals where hospital data is merged with social security data including socio-economic characteristics. A treatment group and a comparison group are created based on a quasi-natural experiment design. We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions and Heckman two-step selection models for program evaluation, where we use the distance between nearest hospitals of different types as the exclusion restriction for the FRW scheme in the empirical analysis. 4 The distance variable used as the exclusion restriction in the selection model should affect the decision to enter the FRW scheme, but should not directly affect our outcome variables length of sick leave and return to work.
We conclude that the type of prioritization that the FRW scheme represents do not give the welfare effects policymakers envisaged. We find that the waiting times 5 for patients who received treatment through the FRW scheme in 2007 and 2008 was 12 to 15 days shorter compared to people on sick-leave enlisted on the regular waiting list. 6 However, the reduction in waiting times is only partially transformed into a reduction in total length of sick leave. On average, the reduction in total length of sick leave is around eight days. The welfare analysis shows that effect on the duration of sick leave is not strong enough to outweigh the costs of the FRW scheme.
2 Other measures to reduce sickness absence are discussed in depth in OECD (2010) , and for Norway in Mykletun et al. (2010) .
3 Still, the scheme is not large enough to supply services to all on sick leave in need of treatment. At any point of time there will be more people on sick leave in the ordinary waiting list than on the FRW waiting list. 4 More precisely, the distance variable used as the exclusion restriction is defined as the distance to the nearest FRW hospital minus the distance to the nearest hospital of any type (FRW or regular hospital) for each patient.
For more information about the exclusion restriction see Section 5. 5 Waiting times are calculated from the commencement of the sick leave period.
We do find a significant difference between surgical and non-surgical patients though.
Patients undergoing surgical treatment benefit the most, both in terms of shorter length of sick leave and shorter waiting times. Patients undergoing surgical treatment through the FRW scheme have episodes of sick leave that are 15 to 23 days shorter, on average, compared to surgical patients on the regular waiting list. We find no significant effect of the FRW scheme on length of sick leave for non-surgical patients.
The paper continues in Section 2 with a description of the institutional settings. Section 3 gives a short literature review. Data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4.
Presentation of the empirical methods follows in Section 5. Main results are presented in section 6. The results are discussed in Section 7.
Institutional setting
The Norwegian sickness benefit scheme is organized under the public National Insurance Scheme (NIS). All workers are entitled to sickness benefits if: (1) their occupational activity has lasted for at least 14 days with the same employer, (2) they have an annual income of at least half the basic income, and (3) they are incapable of working because of sickness.
Employees may self-certify illnesses a maximum of four times a year for periods of no more than three days each time. 7 Otherwise, a physician, in most cases a GP, assesses all absence caused by sickness. For employees, statutory sickness benefits are 100 % of pensionable income and are paid from the first day of sickness for a maximum period of 260 working-days (52 weeks). The employer pays the sickness benefits for the first 16 days and the NIS pays the remainder.
8
The health care system is tax-based, provides universal access and is predominantly public. Provision of primary health care, including services from GPs, is the responsibility of local authorities, whereas provision of hospital services is the responsibility of state-owned hospitals. The hospital sector is organized into four Regional Health Enterprises (RHEs).
Each RHE governs one or more Health Enterprises (HEs) and several hospitals may be grouped into one HE. As in most countries with universal access to health care, waiting times 7 Some firms, called IA firms, have a slightly more generous sickness benefit scheme compared with non-IA firms. The IA agreement is a letter of intent regarding a more inclusive working life, and was agreed between the Government and the labor organizations in 2001. One important goal of the agreement is to reduce the number of people on sickness benefits. See for the protocol between the employer and employee. 8 The Swedish and Dutch sickness schemes are also considered to be generous. Dutch employees are covered for a period of two full years with a replacement rate of maximum 85% (de Jong, 2012) . The replacement rate is slightly lower in Sweden. The first sick day is usually not paid. After that day 80% of the income is paid for 364 days and 75% for a further maximum 550 days.
are relatively long. In 2008, the average waiting time for specialist health care was around 70
days (Norwegian Directorate of Health, 2008) .
The FRW scheme is provided by hospitals, whereas referral to the scheme is normally the responsibility of GPs. GPs have the so-called gate-keeper function and, in general, an individual patient cannot obtain inpatient or outpatient care without a referral from a GP, with the exception of emergency cases. An employee absent from work because of sickness must obtain a sick leave certificate from a GP, and the same GP can help the employee to obtain specialist care by providing a referral to a hospital offering the FRW scheme, or to a hospital that is not under the FRW scheme but offers adequate treatment.
Some patients are registered on a FRW waiting list based on a recommendation from a GP and in compliance with governmental guidelines. These patients are given priority over patients on the regular waiting list. (Holmås and Kjerstad, 2010) .
Non-surgical facilities usually provide multidisciplinary investigation, treatment and rehabilitation for patients with diseases of the musculoskeletal system (e.g.
back/knee/shoulder/neck pain), diseases of the circulatory system (e.g. heart diseases), stress, depression and anxiety, alcohol and drug use, etc. Surgical treatment is typically performed at outpatient clinics for patients with diseases of the musculoskeletal system. 
Literature reviews
Many countries have dedicated funds to reduce waiting times for hospital treatment (Willcox et al., 2007) . We know from UK studies that increased resources at hospitals may reduce waiting times (Martin and Smith, 1999; Dawson et al., 2007) and evidence from 12 OECD countries suggests that increased hospital capacity can play an important role in reducing waiting times (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005) .
However, it is not self-evident that shorter waiting times will result in shorter periods of sick leave, since this assumes a correct diagnosis and a positive effect of treatment. There is some evidence that waiting times and length of sick leave are correlated though. Andrén and Granlund (2010) analysed the impact of waiting times for health care on the length of sick leave and found that waiting times significantly affect the length of sick leave. Engström et al. (2010 Engström et al. ( , 2012 estimate the effects of early interventions in the Swedish sickness insurance system using an experimental design. Early intervention in their analysis means that one group had their work capacity and possibility for vocational rehabilitation evaluated, and meetings between the involved parties held during a 6-week period, while the individuals in the control group were offered the same services after 6 weeks. This creates a difference in mean waiting times for work assessment between the two groups. Engström et al. (2010) find no effect of early intervention on the length of the ongoing sick spell. Engström et al. (2012) find the individuals in the treatment group have longer sickness absence spells and have a higher probability to receive a disability pension compared to individuals in the control group.
Early interventions has no or actually negative effects on sickness absence and disability pensions.
In a systematic review of the effectiveness of multidisciplinary rehabilitation for fibromyalgia and chronic widespread pain, Karjalainen et al. (1999) showed low treatment effects on return to work. Indahl (2004) concludes that no specific treatment has proven to be highly effective for low back pain patients, and that the multitude of different treatments offered must be regarded as pain-modulating modalities only. Frölich et al. (2004) focus on different types of rehabilitative measures, such as passive, workplace, educational, medical, and social, for long-term sick in Sweden. They conclude that no interventions outperform non-participation with regard to return to work, and find that in many cases the length of sickness increases due to treatment. Medical research indicates that for common causes of sick leave such as musculoskeletal pain and mild mental disorders, regular activity through work rather than specific medical treatment helps promote recovery and rehabilitation; see 
Data and descriptive statistics
In the analyses, we use register data from two different sources. The National Insurance
Administration ( After excluding small diagnosis groups (fewer than 50 treatments in 2008), we are left with 84 different FRW diagnosis groups. We then register the hospitals that offer FRW within each diagnostic group. Thus, a hospital can for some ICD10 diagnosis groups treat patients both from the FRW and the regular waiting list, while for other diagnosis groups treats only persons from the regular waiting list.
Second, some patients had more than one admission in 2008. As our interest is in whether reduced waiting times influence the length of sickness absence, we only consider the effect of the first admission. Waiting time in our empirical specification is defined as the period from the start of the sick leave period to the first treatment/consultation. Patient-specific information (such as waiting time, diagnosis, surgery/non-surgery, etc.) used in the analysis is based on the information registered at the first hospital admission. Only patients having an FRW admission as their first treatment/consultation in a treatment series are registered as FRW patients in our data.
Third, many persons are treated at a hospital, with potentially long waiting times, but as long as they are not sick-leave-listed, they are not included in our analysis. We focus on the total length of sick leave, and length of sick leave while waiting for a treatment. Also, all
patients not sick-leave-listed at the time of treatment are excluded from the analysis, as are patients who were referred to hospital before the start of their sickness episode. They have zero waiting time since we define the start of the waiting time from the day a patient is sickleave-listed.
Fourth, as the FRW scheme is intended to reduce waiting times for planned admissions, all emergency admissions are excluded from the analysis. Some sick leave episodes start with a hospital admission. These too are excluded from the analysis since they have zero waiting time.
Fifth, patients admitted after 31 June 2008 are excluded from the analysis. We only have access to data on sick leave episodes that ended before 1 July 2009. By only including patients admitted in the first half of 2008, we are able to track all patients for at least one year (the maximum duration of a sick leave episode). Thus, we have no censoring on the sick leave variable.
Sixth, regular patients not under the FRW scheme treated at an FRW institution are excluded if the hospital offers FRW treatment for this particular diagnosis. This is important to avoid general equilibrium effects on waiting times for both groups, since waiting times for patients on the FRW waiting list and patients on the regular waiting list might affect each other within the same facility, even though according to the scheme, they should not do so.
Finally, patients on the FRW waiting list receiving treatment are the treatment group (FRW=1), whereas patients with similar diagnoses receiving regular treatment are the comparison group (FRW=0).
We do not include patients not in the labour market in our analysis since they do not receive paid sick leave from the National Insurance Agency (NIA). The FRW scheme is intended only for persons in the labour market, and the main goal of the FRW scheme is to reduce the length of sick leave for the working population through reduced waiting times for treatment. The FRW scheme might potentially affect waiting times for non-working patients although this is not an intended effect. Non-working patients in hospitals are generally much older than FRW patients. Descriptive statistics for the treatment and comparison groups are reported in Table 2 .
Because we distinguish between surgical and non-surgical treatment in the analysis, we make the same distinction here. <Table 1 and table 2 around here>
The FRW scheme resulted in an increase in the treatment capacity for certain groups of sick-leave-listed individuals. Therefore, it is expected that, on average, FRW patients will wait shorter than people on sick leave on the regular waiting list. From Table 2 , Columns 2 and 3, we see that the average difference in waiting times is around nine days when we consider all patients, with FRW patients waiting, on average, 105.4 days and regular patients waiting, on average, 114.8 days, for treatment. As mentioned, waiting time is defined as the time from the start of the sick leave episode to the first consultation/treatment. The difference in waiting times between FRW and non-FRW patients is larger for surgical patients than for non-surgical patients. Surgical patients receiving treatment on the FRW waiting list have waiting times that are 14 days shorter than surgical patients in the regular system, whereas the difference for non-surgical patients is seven days.
The descriptive statistics give no support to the belief that a reduction in waiting time results in a shorter sick leave episode and thus faster return to work. We can see from Table 2 that the average length of the sickness absence is almost the same for FRW patients (238.7 days) and regular patients (234.8 days). When we distinguish between surgical and nonsurgical patients, the same conclusion holds. The difference in length of sick leave between FRW and regular patients is modest. Although the sick leave period is almost the same for FRW and regular patients, the waiting times are shorter for FRW patients. Thus, it follows that, on average, the post-treatment sick leave period must be longer for the FRW patients.
We do not find major differences between patients in the FRW group and other patients for most of the socio-economic background variables, given the selection criteria we have used. Patients in the FRW scheme are somewhat younger, have more children and earn less compared with other patients. There could be differences based on unobserved characteristics but based on interviews with GPs we find no clear pattern in the selection process in term of the health status of the patients (Kjerstad and Holmås, 2009 ). However, in the empirical section we use a Heckman two-step selection model to correct for biased results due to potential omitted variables.
The distance variable is defined as the distance to the nearest FRW hospital minus the distance to the nearest hospital of any type (FRW or regular hospital) for each patient. Thus, this variable takes the value zero if the closest hospital is a FRW hospital and a positive value if the closest hospital is a regular hospital not offering the FRW scheme. We see from Table 2 that the mean extra travel distance to the nearest FRW hospital for regular patients is 320 km, while the mean extra travel distance to the nearest FRW for FRW patients is only 22 km. This pattern is similar when we divide the sample according to surgical and non-surgical patients.
We use distance variable as the exclusion restriction in the empirical analyses and discuss this variable further in Section 5.
Empirical methods
A simple econometric analysis of waiting times for hospital treatment on length of sick leave would probably result in a biased regression coefficient due to endogeneity problem. Waiting times vary both in terms of observed factors (e.g. medical diagnosis) and unobserved factors that also influence the length of sick leave (Askildsen et al., 2010 , Askildsen el al., 2011 , Carlsen and Kaarbøe, 2013 . This problem could be solved if we experimentally could change waiting times for treatment but this has not been done. We are not aware of other studies that have used such a design either.
The FRW scheme we analyse is not a RCT. However, waiting times for some patients are affected by the reform, while for others waiting times are constant. Both groups are given the same treatment within the same diagnostic groups.
We estimate the effect of the FRW scheme on the length of sick leave and waiting times using both OLS regressions and Heckman two-step selection models for estimation treatment effects; Heckman (1978) , Cerulli (2011 
where We do not include waiting times as a regressor when explaining length of sick leave in our empirical analysis. A simple analysis of waiting times for hospital treatment on length of sick leave would probably result in a biased regression coefficient due to selection issues. The FRW scheme, however, shifts waiting times for certain groups of patients, while holding waiting times for other patients constant, where both groups are given the same type of medical treatment within diagnostic groups. Thus, our estimation strategy resembles a natural experiment. We do not estimate the relationship between number of days on a waiting list and number of days on sick leave but the effect of the FRW scheme on number of days on sick leave starting from the date the patients enter the waiting list, i.e. from the referral date.
Selection on unobservables
We allow for the fact that patients can choose between the FRW waiting list (FRW hospital) and a regular hospital by estimating a selection model, since free hospital choice applies to all planned investigations and treatment within physical care, and can be affected by many factors. Our selection equation is a function of the same background variables as in equation (out1) with an additional exclusion restriction, and we model the selection into FRW as an index function in the following way Assuming that the error terms are bivariate normal distributed may not be realistic. We have also estimated the model using different specifications involving control functions, matching, IV, 2SLS, switching regressions, and models allowing for heterogenous treatment effects (Cerulli, 2011) . None of these models gave significantly different results compared to the Heckman two-step selection model. All parameters related to heterogeneous effects, where in the simplest models this is just interactions between FRW dummy and background variables, have large standard errors and are not significantly different from zero.
Our model can be formulated to capture heterogeneity both in terms of observed and unobserved factors. We include the different  s in equation (1) 
which is a model where both observed and unobserved factors interact with the treatment variable FRW. We have estimated this model based on the ivtreatreg command in Stata (Cerulli, 2011) . However, the estimated standard errors are very large, and we thus choose to focus on the simpler model where we assume constant treatment effects.
Exclusion restriction
The Distance variable is defined as the distance to the nearest FRW hospital minus the distance to the nearest hospital of any type (FRW or regular hospital) for each patient and is used as an exclusion restriction in our model. If the distance between the patient's home and the nearest regular hospital is 100 km, and the distance between the patient's home and the nearest FRW hospital is 120 km, then the variable i ce Dis tan will take the value 20. The variable Distance will take a value of zero if the closest hospital is an FRW hospital. We believe that one important trade-off that a patient and GP make when choosing between a FRW hospital and a regular hospital is not the distance to a regular hospital, but the extra distance a person has to travel to get to an FRW hospital.
We do not have access to the patient's home address, only to the municipality in which they live or to the city districts to which they belong if they live in one of the four largest cities (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger). Norway has 428 different municipalities of different sizes both in terms of number of inhabitants and geographical size. We use the distance from the centroid of the area in which the patients live as our starting point when we create the distance variable. However, since we use the distance to the nearest FRW hospital minus the distance to the nearest hospital of any type (FRW or regular hospital) for each patient as our exclusion restriction, it is not crucial to have the exact address of each patients,
only to know what hospital is the nearest. As we also use city districts in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger, we are confident that the nearest hospital is correctly defined for the large majority of cases. The distance between hospitals is measured as road distance in kilometres. The road distance to the nearest hospital is short for people living in cities.
However, the extra travel distance to the nearest FRW hospital, if this is not the nearest hospital, is not necessarily short even for persons living in a city.
A patient is more likely to choose an FRW hospital if the additional distance is small. Of course, if the nearest hospital is an FRW hospital then there is an increased probability that the patient will choose this hospital. We hypothesize that  in equation (2) is negative, meaning that the distance as we define it has a negative effect on the probability of choosing a hospital offering FRW treatment compared with treatment at a regular hospital.
It is important that our exclusion restriction is valid. Thus it should be uncorrelated with unobserved factors ( i u ) affecting the length of sick leave, and affect the endogenous dummy variable (FRW). The last assumption could be tested in equation (2) by looking at the significance level of  . We believe that distance between hospitals fulfils these two criteria.
We observe a strong negative association between distance and the probability of being treated at a hospital offering FRW treatment (Table 2) . We find no evidence that the distance variable is correlated with our dependent variables. Length of sick leave may be affected by factors such as health (diagnosis), age, compensation (income), family and work situation and, to some extent, geographical location (municipality, county), etc. (see Alexanderson, 1998; Aakvik et al., 2010; Markussen et al., 2011 ), but should not be affected by the distance between hospitals as we define it. We provide placebo simulation and alternative regressions to test the validity of our exclusion restriction.
Empirical results
In table 3, the results from three different outcome models based on equation (1) are presented. In Column 1, an OLS regression where we use length of sick leave as our dependent variable. Column 2 shows waiting times prior to treatment as our dependent variable, and Column 3 shows the results using the post-treatment (PT) period as our dependent variable, i.e., the period from treatment to the end of the sick leave episode and return to work. In Columns 5-7, we report the results from the same models but now control for unobserved selection using a Heckman two-stage selection model for estimating treatment effects using Distance as our exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction (Distance) is highly significant, with the expected negative sign (Table 3 , Column 4). This is also the case if we divide the regression into surgical patients (Table 4 , Column 4) and non-surgical patients (Table 5 , Column 4). Tables 4 and 5 show the results for surgical and non-surgical patients, respectively. The results based on the selection model indicate that there is no significant selection on unobservable variables in our regressions. None of the selection correction terms («lambda») are statistically significant in Tables 3-5.   10 There are also other factors affecting the probability of choosing the FRW scheme compared with treatment at a regular hospital. Age, number of children, marital status and income (see Table 3 , Column 4), all with the expected signs.
<Table 3,4 and 5 around here>
The main conclusions are that the FRW scheme reduces the length of sick leave by 6.8 days in the OLS regression (Table 3 , Column 1) and by 9.3 days in the selection model (Table   3 , Column 5). However, there is a significant difference between surgical and non-surgical patients. We find a large and significant effect of the FRW scheme for surgical patients. The effect is 15.4 days in the OLS regression (Table 4 , Column 1) and 22.6 days in the selection models (Table 4 , Column 5). However, for non-surgical patients (Table 5) , we find no significant effect of FRW on the length of sick leave.
We find stronger effects on waiting times prior to treatment compared with the total length of sick leave. The FRW scheme shortens waiting times significantly -more so for surgical patients than for non-surgical patients. The effect of FRW on waiting times for all patients is around 14 days (see Table 3 , Columns 2 and 6). For surgical patients, the effect is 19.7 days in the OLS regression (Table 4 , Column 2) and 27,5 days in the Heckman two step selection model (Table 4 , Column 6). The corresponding numbers are 18.8 days and 18.2 days for non-surgical patients (Table 5 ).
The effect of FRW on the period from treatment to the end of the sick leave period (PT) is small and not significant. FRW patients have a post-treatment period that is around four to nine days longer compared with patients in the regular scheme. We find the strongest effect for non-surgical patients, where FRW increases the post-treatment period by 9.5 days (Table   5 , Column 7), but this effect is significant only at the 10 % level. The effect of FRW on the post-treatment period for surgical patients is not significant. number of patients within a given diagnosis at each hospital, mean age of the patients, percentage males, and percentage inpatients.
As reported in Table 6 , there is no indication that waiting times were different between FRW institutions and other institutions in the year before the scheme was established. FRW institutions had 2.3 days longer waiting times prior to the reform, with a standard deviation of 3.1. Together with the fact that most hospitals have implemented the scheme (but for different patient groups), we consider this test to be evidence that the FRW scheme was not established in areas with particularly high existing sick leave rates or long waiting times.
A Simple Welfare Analysis
The main welfare effects we are studying here are -on the benefit side -changes in the production loss due to sickness absence and on the cost side, the extra financial resources allocated to the hospital sector due to the FRW scheme. We concentrate on surgical patients, the group of patients with the strongest reduction in sick leave.
More specifically, the benefits are measured as the reduction in number of sick leave days that the FRW scheme leads to. We calculate the effect in Norwegian crowns (NOK) by multiplying the increase in number of working days with daily gross wages, i.e. wages inclusive social costs and taxes. This gives us an estimate of the aggregate benefit of the FRW scheme measured in NOK. The costs are measured as the aggregate cost associated with the FWR scheme. We base our calculations on the following parameters: 
Discussions
The Faster Return to Work (FRW) scheme that Norwegian authorities implemented in 2007 is an example of a policy that builds on the human capital approach. The main idea behind the scheme is that long waiting times for hospital treatment lead to unnecessarily long periods of absence from work. To achieve a reduction in average sickness absence duration, the allocation of new funds and treatment capacity financed through the FRW scheme is exclusively for people on sick leave. Many countries have allocated funds to reduce waiting times for hospital treatment and research shows that more resources allocated to the hospital sector reduce waiting times. Our results confirm this as the FRW scheme significantly reduces waiting times for both surgical and non-surgical patients. However, on average this reduction in waiting times is not transformed into a reduction in the sickness absence period, the main aim of the FRW scheme.
11 We express the change productivity loss in numbers of days. We value these days based on 2007 wage income data from The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV). 12 We have used the same payroll tax rate across the whole country. 13 Ministry of Finance recommends to use the factor 1.2 in feasibility studies of large public projects.
There is a significant difference in the effects of FRW on length of sick leave between surgical and non-surgical patients though. The duration of sick leave for FRW patients undergoing surgical treatment is 15 to 23 days shorter than for surgical patients on the regular waiting list. We find no significant effect of the scheme on length of sick leave for nonsurgical patients. In sum, our welfare analysis indicates that prioritization of the kind that the FRW scheme represents is not as straightforward as one would expect.
The fact that the shorter waiting time translates into a shorter sick leave period for surgical patients only can be an indication that hospital treatment has limited effect for nonsurgical patients. If two non-surgical patients undergo the same treatment, and the patient on the FRW scheme has a shorter waiting time, yet both patients start and end their sick leave at the same time, then time and not treatment seems to be the relevant healing factor. There are at least two reasons that treatment can have a limited effect for non-surgical patients.
Some patients have diffuse musculoskeletal pain and symptoms, and it can be difficult to Our results are more optimistic for surgical patients, where the necessary procedures are more likely to be aimed at specific conditions with an ex ante higher expected success rate compared with the diagnoses discussed for non-surgical patients. The surgery is based on well-established procedures, patients have clear cut and limited problems, and rehabilitation after surgery is normally fast because of the limited impact that many procedures have on soft tissue and so on. Thus, more surgical capacity leads to shorter waiting times, which transforms into a shorter length of sick leave.
Our analysis indicates that people in favour of the human capital approach should suggest, at least in the case of the FRW scheme, to "prioritize among the prioritized". The cost-benefit ratio would probably be improved by targeting surgical patients since surgical patients benefit the most from shorter waiting times. However, prioritising patients in need of surgical procedures creates additional equity issues to those already presented by the FRW scheme. Allocating additional hospital resources specifically aimed at people who are active in the labour market and in need of surgical treatment raises equity and ethical issues that are not addressed further here. The FRW scheme may still be a more flexible way of allocating funds in the sense that health authorities probably more easily can downsize the supply of surgical capacity if need be.
Even though shorter waiting times do not translate into a shorter length of sick leave for non-surgical patients, the reduction of waiting times can be a goal in itself. Patients waiting for treatment generally do not suffer an immediate wage loss because sickness benefits amount to 100 % of current wages within the Norwegian social insurance system. The costs of being on a waiting list are connected to entering the list and receiving the benefit (treatment) later rather than now. Propper (1995) argued that, in the health care context, there is a disutility cost of time spent on a waiting list that is not just the result of a positive decay rate. As individuals on a waiting list for medical care are in poorer health than is normal, they may not be able to carry out normal activities and, thus, they suffer a utility loss. Note: * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Note: * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. Note: * significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. 
